We solve the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) problem in merely monotone games with expected value cost functions. Specifically, we present the first distributed SGNE seeking algorithm for monotone games that only requires one proximal computation (e.g., one projection step) and only one pseudogradient evaluation per iteration.
Introduction
In a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), some agents interact with the aim of minimizing their individual cost functions under some joint feasibility constraints. Due to the presence of the shared constraints, computing a GNE is usually hard. Despite this challenge, GNEPs has been studied extensively within the system and control community, for their applicability, e.g., in energy markets [38, 25, 17, 30, 23] .
Unfortunately, the stochastic counterpart of GNEP is not studied as much [31, 24, 41] . A stochastic GNEP (SGNEP) is a constrained problem where the cost functions are expected value functions. Such problems arise when there is some uncertainty, expressed through a random variable with an unknown distribution. For instance, any networked Cournot games with market capacity constraints and uncertainty in the demand can be modelled by a SGNE [11, 1] . Other realistic examples arise in transportation systems, where the drivers perception of travel time is a possible source of uncertainty [37] , and in electricity markets where companies should dispatch energy without perfectly knowing the actual demand [19] .
If the random variable is known, the expected value formulation can be solved with any standard technique for the deterministic counterpart. In fact, one possible approach for SGNEPs is to recast the problem as a stochastic variational inequality (SVI) through the use of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Then, the problem can be rewritten as a monotone inclusion and possibly solved via operator splitting techniques. To find a zero of such an operator, we propose a stochastic relaxed forward backward (SRFB) algorithm. Our work is inspired by [26] where the authors propose a deterministic algorithm to solve a variational inequality problem. Besides the shared constraints, the additional difficulty in stochastic GNEPs is that the pseudogradient mapping is usually not directly accessible, for instance because the expected value is hard to express in closed form or to compute. For this reason, in many cases, the search for a solution of a SVI should rely on samples of the random variable.
Depending on the number of samples, there are two main methodologies available: the stochastic approximation (SA) and the sample average approximation (SAA). The SA scheme was the first one to be proposed [32] . In this approximation scheme, each agent samples only one realization of the random variable. While it is computationally light, in general, it requires stronger assumptions on the mappings and on the parameters involved [24, 40, 39] . In the SAA approach, the expected value is replaced with the average over an increasing number of samples of the random variable. This approach is reasonable, for instance, in Monte Carlo simulations or in machine learning problems, where there is a huge number of data available [5, 21] .
The ideal algorithm for finding a SGNE, independently on the approximation scheme, should be distributed, it should converge under weak monotonicity assumptions and it should be relatively fast. For SVIs, there are several methods in the literature that satisfy one or more of these criteria. Among others, one can consider the stochastic preconditioned forward-backward algorithm (SpFB) [15] for its convergence speed and low computational cost. The downside of this algorithm is that the pseudogradient mapping must be (monotone and) cocoercive (see [18] for an example of non convergence in non-cocoercive monotone games). Similarly, one can consider the stochastic projected reflected gradient scheme (SPRG) [8, 9] that is fast but requires the so-called weak sharpness property (which is implied by the cocoercivity) that is, however, hard to check on the problem data. Nonetheless, weakening the assumption on the pseudogradient to mere monotonicity translates into having computationally expensive algorithms. In this case, one could dualize the coupling constraints and apply the extragradient (EG) scheme [21] with two projection steps per iteration or the forward-backward-forward (FBF) algorithm [5] that has only one projection but, two evaluations of the pseudogradient per each iteration. These considerations are summarized in Table 1 , which includes also a comparison with our proposed SRFB algorithm. Essentially, for merely monotone games, our SRFB algorithm has the lowest computational complexity per iteration. SFBF [5] SEG [21] SPRG [9] SpFB [15] Our main contributions are summarized next:
• Inspired by the relaxed forward-backward operator splitting in [26] , we propose the first distributed algorithm with a single proximal computation (e.g. projection) and a single pseudogradient evaluation per iteration for solving stochastic (non strictly/strongly monotone, non-cocoercive) monotone stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems;
• We show that our algorithm converges to a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium under monotonicity of the pseudogradient with the sample average approximation scheme;
• For the stochastic Nash equilibrium problem, we show convergence with both SAA and SA schemes and under some variants of monotonicity.
We emphasize that, unlike [24, 41, 15] , we do not assume that the pseudogradient mapping is strictly/strongly monotone nor cocoercive or similar.
In Section 7.3 we illustrate the computational advantages of our algorithm with respect to the state of the art.
Notation and preliminaries 2.1 Notation
Let R indicate the set of real numbers and letR = R∪{+∞}. ·, · : R n ×R n → R denotes the standard inner product and · represents the associated euclidean norm. We indicate that a matrix A is positive definite, i.e., x ⊤ Ax > 0, with A ≻ 0. Given a symmetric Φ ≻ 0, denote the Φ-induced inner product, x, y Φ = Φx, y . The associated Φ-induced norm, · Φ , is defined as x Φ = Φx, x . A⊗B indicates the Kronecker product between matrices A and B. 0 m indicates the vector with m entries all equal to 0. Given N vectors x 1 , . . . , x N ∈ R n ,
J F = (I +F ) −1 is the resolvent of the operator F : R n → R n and Id indicates the identity operator. The set of fixed points of the operator F is fix F = {x ∈ R n : x = F (x)}. For a closed set C ⊆ R n , the mapping proj C : R n → C denotes the projection onto C, i.e., proj C (x) = argmin y∈C y − x . The residual mapping is, in general, defined as res(
Let g be a proper, lower semi-continuous, convex function. We denote the subdifferential as the maximal monotone operator ∂g(
. ι C is the indicator function of the set C, that is, ι C (x) = 1 if x ∈ C and ι C (x) = 0 otherwise. The set-valued mapping N C : R n → R n denotes the normal cone operator for the the set C , i.e.,
Operator theory
In this section, we collect some notions on properties of operators. The definitions are taken from [14] . First, we recall that F is ℓ-Lipschitz continuous if, for
Definition 1 (Monotone operators). Given a mapping F : dom(F ) ⊆ R n → R n , we say that:
• F is firmly non expansive if for all x, y ∈ dom(F )
An example of firmly non expansive operator is the projection operator over a nonempty, compact and convex set [3, Proposition 4.16] . We note that a firmly non expansive operator is also non expansive and firmly quasinonexpansive [3, Definition 4.1] .
We note that if a mapping is β-cocoercive it is also 1/β-Lipschitz continuous [3, Remark 4.15 ].
Stochastic Generalized Nash equilibrium problems
We consider a set of noncooperative agents I = {1, . . . , N }, each of them choosing its strategy x i ∈ R ni with the aim of minimizing its local cost function within its feasible strategy set. The local decision set of each agent is indicated with Ω i , so that for all i ∈ I,
Besides the local decision set, each agent is subject to some joint feasibility constraints. In fact, we consider a game with affine coupling constraints Ax ≤ b. The feasible decision set of each agent i ∈ I is denoted with the set value mapping
where A i ∈ R m×n defines how agent i is involved in the coupling constraints and b ∈ R m . Let us set n = N i=1 n i , then, given Ω = N i=1 Ω i and A = [A 1 , . . . , A N ] ∈ R m×n , the collective feasible set can be written as
Assumption 1 (Constraint qualification). For each i ∈ I, the set Ω i is nonempty, compact and convex. The set X satisfies Slater's constraint qualification.
The local cost function of agent i is defined as
for some measurable function J i : R n × R d → R. The cost function J i of agent i ∈ I depends on the local variable x i , the decisions of the other players x −i = col((x j ) j =i ) and the random variable ξ : Ξ → R d that express the uncertainty. E ξ represent the mathematical expectation with respect to the distribution of the random variable ξ(ω) 1 in the probability space (Ξ, F , P). We assume that E[J i (x, ξ)] is well defined for all the feasible x ∈ X [31] . Moreover, the cost function present the typical splitting in a smooth part and a non smooth part. The latter is indicated with g i : R ni →R and it can represent a local cost or local constraints via the indicator function, i.e. g i (x i ) = ι Ωi (x i ).
Assumption 2 (Cost function convexity). For each i ∈ I, the function g i in (3) is lower semicontinuous and convex and dom(g i ) = Ω i . For each i ∈ I and
Given the decision variables of the other agents x −i , each agent i aims at choosing a strategy x i , that solves its local optimization problem, i.e., ∀i ∈ I : min
From a game theoretic perspective, the solution concept that we are seeking is that of stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE).
Definition 2.
A Stochastic Generalized Nash equilibrium is a collective strategy x * ∈ X such that for all i ∈ I
In other words, a SGNE is a set of strategies where none of agent can decrease its objective function by unilaterally deviating from its decision.
To guarantee that a SGNE exists, we make further assumptions on the cost function [31] .
Assumption 3 (Cost functions measurability). For each i ∈ I and for each ξ ∈ Ξ, the function J i (·, x −i , ξ) is convex, Lipschitz continuous, and continuously differentiable. The function
Existence of a SGNE of the game in (4) Within all the possible Nash equilibria, we focus on those that corresponds to the solution set of an appropriate stochastic variational inequality. To this aim, let us denote the pseudogradient mapping as
and let G(x) = col(∂g 1 (x 1 ), . . . , ∂g N (x N )).
The possibility to exchange the expected value and the pseudogradient in (5) is guaranteed by Assumption 3. Then, the associated stochastic variational inequality (SVI) reads as
When Assumptions 1-3 hold, any solution of SVI(X , F) in (7) is a SGNE of the game in (4) while viceversa does not hold in general. This is because a game may have a Nash equilibrium while the corresponding VI may have no solution [29, Proposition 12.7] . We call variational equilibria (v-SGNE) the SGNE that are also solution of the associated SVI, namely, the solution of the SVI(X , F) in (7) where F is described in (5) and X is defined in (2) . In the remaining part of this section we recast the SGNEP as a monotone inclusion, i.e., the problem of finding a zero of a set-valued monotone operator. To this aim, we characterize the SGNE of the game in terms of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the coupled optimization problems in (4). Let us define the Lagrangian function, for each i ∈ I, with
where λ i ∈ R m ≥0 is the Lagrangian dual variable associated with the coupling constraints. Then, a set of strategies x * is a SGNE if and only if the following KKT conditions are satisfied [13, Theorem 4.6] :
Similarly, we can use the KKT conditions to characterize a variational problem, studying the Lagrangian function associated to the SVI in (7) :
Remark 2. The interest in the KKT conditions comes from [12, Theorem 3.1], [2, Theorem 3.1] that provide a criteria to select SGNE that are also solution of the SVI. Formally, if x * is a solution of the SVI(X , F) in (7) at which the KKT conditions in (9) hold, then x * is a solution of the SGNEP in (4) at which the KKT conditions in
Essentially, [12, Theorem 3.1], [2, Theorem 3.1] say that v-SGNE are those such that the shared constraints have the same dual variable for all the agents.
The distributed stochastic relaxed forwardbackward algorithm
In this section we describe the details that leads to the distributed iterations presented in Algorithm 1. We suppose that each player i knows its local data Ω i , A i and b i . Moreover, the agents have access to a pool of samples of the random variable and are able to compute, given the actions of the other players x −i , the pseudogradient of their own cost functions
(or an approximation, as exploited later in this section).
The set of agents j whose decisions affect the cost function of angent i, are denoted by
Let us also introduce the graph G λ = (I, E λ ) through which a local copy of the dual variable is shared. As mentioned in Remark 2, we seek for a v-SGNE with consensus of the dual variables. Therefore, along with the dual variable, agents share through G λ a copy of an auxiliary variable z i ∈ R m whose role is to force consensus. A deeper insight on this variable is given later in this section. The set of edges E λ of the multiplier graph G λ , is given by:
: Receives x k j for all j ∈ N J i and z k j , λ k j for j ∈ N λ i , then updates:
In this way, each agent control his own decision variable and a local copy of the dual variable λ i and of the auxiliary variable z i and, through the graphs, it obtains the other agents variables.
Assumption 4 (Graph connectivity). The multiplier graph G λ is undirected and connected.
The weighted adjacency matrix associated to G λ is denoted with W ∈ R N ×N . Then, letting D = diag{d 1 , . . . , d N } where d i = N j=1 w i,j is the degree of agent i, the associated Laplacian is given by L = D − W ∈ R N ×N . It follows from Assumption 4 that L = L ⊤ .
Let us now rewrite the KKT conditions in (9) in compact form as
T : X ×R m ≥0 ⇒ R n ×R m is a set-valued mapping and it follows that the v-SGNE of the game in (4) correspond to the zeros of the mapping T .
The operator T can be written as a summation of two operators
A :
To force consensus on the dual variables, the authors in [38] proposed the Laplacian constraint Lλ = 0. This is why, to preserve monotonicity, we expand the two operators A and B in (11) and introduce the auxiliary variable z = col(z 1 , . . . , z N ) ∈ R N m . Let us first define L = L ⊗ Id m ∈ R N m×N m and A = diag{A 1 , . . . , A N } ∈ R N m×n , where L is the laplacian of G λ and A i represent the individual coupling constraints. Let us also define λ = col(λ 1 , . . . , λ N ) ∈ R N m and similarly b of suitable dimensions. Then, the two operators A and B in (11) can be rewritten as
From now on, we indicate the state variable as ω = col(x, z, λ). The properties of the operators in (12) depends on the properties of F and are described in the next section. We here show that the zeros ofĀ +B are the same as the zeros of T in (10). Lemma 1. Let Assumptions 1-4 hold and consider the operators A and B in (11) , and the operatorsĀ andB in (12) . Then the following statements hold.
(i) Given any ω * ∈ zer(Ā +B), x * is a v-SGNE of game in (4), i.e., x * solves the VI(X , F) in (7) . Moreover λ * = 1 N ⊗ λ * , and (x * , λ * ) satisfy the KKT condition in (9) i.e., col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(A + B). Proof. See Appendix 9.
From now on, we call Z = X × R mN × R mN ≥0 and Z * the set of v-SGNE, i.e., Z * = zer(Ā +B).
Since the distribution of the random variable is unknown, the expected value mapping can be hard to compute. Therefore, we take an approximation of the pseudogradient mapping. At this stage, it is not important if we use the stochastic approximation scheme or the sample average approximation scheme, therefore, in what follows, we replaceĀ witĥ
whereF is an approximation of the expected value mapping F in (5) given some realizations of the random vector ξ.
Then, Algorithm 1 can be written in compact form as [26] 
where Φ ≻ 0 contains the inverse of step size sequences
and α −1 , ν −1 , σ −1 are diagonal matrices.
Convergence analysis with SAA
Now, we study the convergence of the algorithm using the sample average approximation (SAA) scheme. First, to ensure thatĀ andB have the properties that we use for the convergence result, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 5 (Monotonicity). F as in (5) is monotone and ℓ F -Lipschitz continuous for some ℓ F > 0.
Then, the two operatorsĀ andB in (12) have the following properties.
Lemma 2. Let Assumptions 4 and 5 hold and let Φ ≻ 0. Then, the operators A andB in (12) have the following properties.
1.Ā is monotone and ℓĀ-Lipschitz continuous.
2. The operatorB is maximally monotone.
Proof. See Appendix 9.
We now enter the details of the SAA scheme. We suppose that, at each iteration, the agents have access to a pool of samples of the random variable and are able to compute an approximation of F(x) of the form
where ξ = col(ξ 1 , . . . ,ξ n ), for all i ∈ I,ξ i = col(ξ
) and ξ is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables drawn from P. Approximations of the form (16) are very common in Monte-Carlo simulation approaches, machine learning and computational statistics [5] ; they are easy to obtain in case we are able to sample from the measure P.
In the SAA approach, typical assumptions are related to the choice of a proper batch size sequence [5, 21] . Assumption 6 (Increasing batch size). The batch size sequence (S k ) k≥1 is such that, for some c, k 0 , a > 0,
Form Assumption 6, it follows that 1/S k is summable, which is a standard assumption in SAA schemes. This assumption is often used in combination with the forthcoming variance reduction assumption to control the stochastic error [5, 21] . For k ≥ 0, the approximation error is defined as
Remark 3. Since there is no uncertainty in the constraints, we indicate with ε k = col(ǫ k , 0, 0) the error on the extended operator, i.e.,
A SAA is the operatorÂ in (13) with approximationF = F SAA as in (16) .
In the stochastic framework, there are usually assumptions on the expected value and variance of the stochastic error ǫ k [21, 24, 22] .
Let us define the filtration F = {F k }, that is, a family of σ-algebras such that F 0 = σ (X 0 ) and
Assumption 7 (Zero mean error). The stochastic error is such that, for all k ≥ 0, a.s., E ǫ k |F k = 0. Assumption 8 (Bounded variance). For all x ∈ X and p ≥ 1, let
then, there exist p ≥ 2, σ 0 ≥ 0, and a measurable locally bounded function σ : SOL(X , F) → R such that for all x ∈ X and all x * ∈ SOL(X , F)
In what follows, we consider a stronger inequality than Assumption 8, namely, for all x ∈ X and σ > 0
to simplify the exposition. In the literature, Equation (17) is known as uniform bounded variance. This assumption is reasonable in our game theoretic framework since we have a bounded feasible set while Assumption 8 is more appropriate for unbounded domains. We also remark that all the following results, proved under Equation (17), hold also in the more general case given by Assumption 8 and using the L p norm for any p ≥ 2. We refer to [5, 21] for a more detailed insight on this general case.
Lastly, we postulate some assumptions on the parameters involved.
Assumption 9 (Averaging parameter). The averaging parameter δ in (14) is such that
is the golden ratio.
Assumption 10 (Step size bound). The steps size is such that
where ℓĀ is the Lipschitz constant ofĀ as in Lemma 2.
We are now ready to state our convergence result. Proof. See Appendix 11.
If the local non smooth cost is given only by the local constraints, i.e., g i (x i ) = ι Ωi (x i ), the problem is slightly different and the algorithm converges with a weaker assumption than monotonicity.
The first difference is that the operatorB is now given bȳ B :
and we can take the projection instead of the proximal operator. Therefore, the algorithm in compact form reads as
where
To show convergence, let the mappingĀ satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 11 (Almost restricted pseudo monotonicity). The operatorĀ is such that for all ω ∈ Z and ω * ∈ Z *
Remark 5. The property in (20) is implied by both monotonicity and pseudomonotonicity but it does not necessarily hold forĀ if we assume it directly on F. It corresponds to the concept of weak solution of a VI, compared to that of strong solution as in (7) [10] . It is also used in [5, 35] and an example of a mapping that satisfy (20) can be found in [10, Equation 2 .4].
We can now state the convergence result. Proof. See Appendix 11.
Remark 6. Using a SA scheme is not possible in this case because a vanishing step size sequence should be taken to control the stochastic error. Having a time varying step size sequence implies using a variable metric, induced by
for the convergence analysis. Although using a variable metric is doable, the matrix Φ k should satisfy some assumptions that do not hold if the step size sequence is diminishing [6] .
Convergence under cocoercivity
Having a weak monotonicity condition on the pseudogradient implies taking a small, although constant, step size sequence. However, if the pseudogradient mapping satisfy a stronger monotonicity assumption, a larger step size can be chosen. We discuss this case next.
The stronger assumption is to satisfy the cut property (described in details in Remark 8 later on), that follows from cocoercivity. For this reason, we make the following assumption on the pseudogradient mapping.
Assumption 12 (Cocoercivity). F as in (5) is β F -cocoercive for some β F > 0.
The operator splitting that we used in Section 4 is not cocoercive, even when the mapping F is. For this reason we here propose the followinḡ C :
Lemma 1 guarantees that a zero ofC +D exists. Moreover,C andD in (21) have the following properties. (i)C is θ-cocoercive where 0 < θ ≤ min 1 2d * , β and d * is the maximum weighted degree of G λ ;
(ii) The operatorD is maximally monotone;
Also in this case, we use an approximation to compute the expected value, therefore, similarly to (13) ,
In this case, the SRFB algorithm is given bȳ
where the preconditioning matrix Ψ is defined as
with α −1 , ν −1 , σ −1 defined as in (15) and A and L are, respectively, the extended constraints and Laplacian matrix. The distributed SRFB steps reads as in Algorithm 2. We notice that Algorithm 2 differs from Algorithm 1 in the computation of the dual variable λ k+1 which, in this case, depends also on the variables x k+1 and z k+1 .
Convergence analysis with SAA
Since the matrix Ψ must be positive definite [4] , we postulate the following assumption.
Assumption 13 (Step size sequence). The step size sequence is such that, given γ > 0, for every agent i ∈ I
where δ is the averaging parameter and ℓC is the Lipschitz constant ofC.
Algorithm 2 Stochastic Relaxed Preconditioned Forward Backward (SRpFB)
Initialization:
: Receives x k j for all j ∈ N J i , λ k j for j ∈ N λ i then updates:
: Receives z j,k+1 for all j ∈ N λ i then updates:
We are now ready to state the convergence result. Proof. See Appendix 12.
Stochastic Nash equilibrium problems
In this section we consider a non-generalized SNEP, namely, a SGNEP without shared constraints. We consider a set I = {1, . . . , N } of noncooperative agents choosing their strategy x i ∈ R ni from its local decision set Ω i . The local cost function of agent i is defined as in (3) with g i (x i ) = ι Ωi . Assumptions 1-3 holds also in this case.
The aim of each agent i, given the decision variables of the other agents x −i , is to choose a strategy x i , that solves its local optimization problem, i.e., ∀i ∈ I : min
As a solution, we aim to compute a stochastic Nash equilibrium (SNE), that is, a collective strategy x * ∈ Ω such that for all i ∈ I
We note that, compared to Definition 2, here we consider only local constraints.
Also in this case, we study the associated stochastic variational inequality (SVI) given by
where F is defined in (5) .
The stochastic variational equilibrium (v-SNE) of game (25) is defined as the solution of the SVI(Ω, F) in (26) where F is described in (5) . The SRFB iterations for SNEPs are shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Stochastic Relaxed Forward Backward
Initialization: x 0 i ∈ Ω i Iteration k: Agent i receives x k j for all j ∈ N J i , then updates:
Convergence analysis with SA
If one has a limited number of samples, the so-called stochastic approximation (SA) scheme should be used. Specifically, in this case we sample only one realisation of the random variable, that is,
where ξ k = col(ξ k 1 , . . . , ξ k N ) ∈ R N is a collection of i.i.d. random variables drawn from P.
Taking fewer samples is less computationally expensive but we have to make some further assumptions on the pseudogradient mapping.
Assumption 14 (Cut property). F in (5) is such that:
Remark 8. The cut property means that, given a solution x * , it can be verified if another pointx is also a solution by looking only atx and x * instead of comparingx with all the points in X . A very intuitive example is the search for a minimum of a single-valued function [20] . The class of mappings that satisfy this assumption is that of paramonotone (or monotone + ) operators. A paramonotone operator is a monotone operator such that for all x, y ∈ X
This property does not hold in general for monotone operators. It holds for strongly and strictly monotone operators, because in this cases there is only one solution [14, Theorem 2.3.3] , and for cocoercive operators. Indeed, strict monotonicity implies paramonotonicity that in turn implies monotonicity [20, Definition 2.1]. The same holds for cocoercive operators that are also paramonotone and consequently monotone [14, Definition 2.3.9] . We refer to [20, 7] for a deeper insight on this class of operators.
Assumption 15 (Bounded pseudogradient). F is bounded, i.e., there exists
Even if this assumption is quite strong, it is reasonable in our game theoretic framework. On the other hand, we do not require F to be Lipschitz continuous, which is practical since computing the Lipschitz constant is in general difficult.
With a little abuse of notation, we denote the approximation error again with
Concerning the assumptions on the stochastic error, we still suppose that it has zero expected value (Assumption 7) but we do not need an explicit bound on the variance. Assumption 16 (Parameter and step sizes). The averaging parameter is such that δ ∈ (0, 1). The step size is square summable and such that
We now state the main convergence result of this section. Proof. See Appendix 13.
Remark 9. We note that Theorem 3 holds also in the deterministic case, under the same assumptions with the exception of those on the stochastic error (that is not present in this case).
Formally, under Assumptions 1-4, 14-16, Algorithm 3 converges to a v-NE of the game in (25) . Moreover, one can use [26, Algorithm 1] to find a deterministic NE.
Discussion on further monotonicity assumptions
In this section we discuss some consequences of Theorems 1 and 3. In particular, we discuss different monotonicity notions that can be used to find a SNE in relation with the two possible approximation schemes.
First of all, Algorithm 1 with SAA scheme can be used also for SNEPs. Proof. Set A = 0 and b = 0 and apply Theorem 1.
Remark 10. Also in this case, the condition presented in Remark 5 can be used instead of monotonicity.
The same result holds in the case of cocoercive mappings but in this case Assumption 12 can be reduced to the cut property. Concerning the SA scheme, there are other assumptions that can be considered.
Assumption 17 (Acute angle relation). F as in (5) satisfies the acute angle relation, i.e., for all x ∈ X and x * ∈ SOL(F, Ω)
Remark 11. The acute angle relation is implied by strict pseudomonotonicity which is in turn implied by strict monotonicity [22, Definition 2] . It is stronger than the assumption in Remark 5 since the condition is satisfied with the strict inequality. Finally, let us consider the so-called weak sharpness property.
Assumption 18 (Weak sharpness). F satisfies the weak sharpness property, i.e. for all x ∈ X , x * ∈ SOL(F, Ω) and for some c > 0
x − x * Remark 12. Assumption 18 is stronger than that in Remark 5 and it is often used in addition to monotonicity [22, 9] . It is sometimes considered a property of the solution set and it is implied by paramonotonicity [27, Theorem 4.1] .
Corollary 5. Let Assumptions 1-3, 7, 16, 18 hold. Then, the sequence {x k } k∈N generated by Algorithm 3 converges a.s. to a v-SNE of the game in (25) .
Proof. See Appendix 14.
Comparative numerical simulations
Let us now propose some numerical simulations to corroborate the theoretical analysis. We compare our algorithm with the stochastic distributed preconditioned forward-backward (SpFB) [34, 15] , forward-backward-forward (SFBF) [16, 5] , extragradient (SEG) [21] and projected reflected gradient (SPRG) [9, 8] algorithms, using the SAA scheme. We present two sets of simulations: a Cournot game and an academic example. While the first is a realistic application to an electricity market with market capacity constraints, the second is built to show the advantages of the SRFB algorithm.
All the simulations are performed on Matlab R2019a with a 2,3 GHz Intel Core i5 and 8 GB LPDDR3 RAM.
Illustrative example
We start with the built up example, that is, a monotone (non-cocoercive) stochastic Nash equilibrium problem with two players with strategies x 1 and x 2 respectively, and pseudogradient mapping
The mapping is monotone and the random variables are sampled from a normal distribution with mean 1 and finite variance. The problem is unconstrained and the optimal solution is (0, 0). The step sizes are taken to be the highest possible. As one can see from Figure 1 , the SpFB does not converge in this case because stronger monotonicity properties on the mapping should be taken. Moreover, we note that the SPRG is not guaranteed to converge under mere monotonicity. From Figure 2 instead, we note that the SRFB algorithm requires fewer communications than the EG and guarantee convergence.
Case study: Network Cournot game
We consider the network Cournot game proposed in [26, 28] with the addition of markets capacity constraints [38, 41] .
Let us consider a set of N companies that sell a commodity in a set of m markets. Each company decides the quantity x i of product to be delivered in the n i markets it is connected with. Each company has a local cost function c i (x i ) related to the production of the commodity. We assume that the cost function is not uncertain as the companies should know their own cost of production. Since the markets have a bounded capacity b = [b 1 , . . . , b m ], the collective constraints are given by Ax ≤ b where A = [A 1 , . . . , A N ]. Each A i indicates in which markets each company participates. The prices are collected in a mapping P : R m × Ξ → R that denotes the inverse demand curve. The random variable ξ ∈ Ξ represents the demand uncertainty. The cost function of each agent is therefore given by
Simulations
As a numerical setting, we consider a set of 20 companies and 7 markets, connected as in [38, Fig. 1 ]. Following [38] , we suppose that the dual variables graph is a cycle graph with the addition of the edges (2, 15) and (6, 13) .
Each company i has local constraints of the form 0 < x i ≤ θ i where each component of θ i is randomly drawn from [1, 1.5] . The maximal capacity b j of a market j is randomly drawn from [0.5, 1]. The local cost function of company i is
where [x i ] j indicates the j component of x i . π i is randomly drawn from [0.5, 5], and each component of q i is randomly drawn from [1, 100] . Similarly to [26, 28] , we assume that the inverse demand function is of the form P (x, ξ) = Λ(ξ)
where γ = 1.1 and Λ(ξ) is drawn following a normal distribution with mean 5000 and finite variance. We note that the mapping in (29) is monotone but it may be not Lipschitz continuous depending on β and γ.
We simulate the SpFB, SFBF, SEG, SPRG and SRFB to make a comparison using the SAA scheme. Since the mapping is not Lipschitz continuous, we tune the step sizes to be one half of the minimum step that causes instability. The plots in Fig. 3 and 4 show respectively the residual of x k (res(x k )) that measure the distance from x k being a solution, and the distance from consensus of the multipliers ( L ⊗ I 7 λ k ). The plot in Fig. 5 shows the number of communications needed to reach a solution. As one can see from Fig. 3 and 5 , our algorithm is slower than the SpFB as ours involves the averaging step but it is faster than the extragradient scheme. Remarkably, the fact that the mapping is only monotone and not Lipschitz continuous prevent the SFBF and SPRG from converging but it does not affect the other algorithms. 
Conclusion
The stochastic relaxed forward-backward algorithm is applicable to stochastic (generalized) Nash equilibrium seeking in merely monotone games. To approximate the expected valued pseudogradient, the sample average approximation scheme or the stochastic approximation scheme can be used to guarantee almost sure convergence to an equilibrium. Our stochastic relaxed forward-backward algorithm is the first distributed algorithm with single proximal computation and single pseudogradient evaluation per iteration for merely monotone stochastic games.
Appendix: Properties of the extended operators
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of (i) can be obtained similarly to [38, Theorem 2] . Concerning (ii), given Assumption 1-3, the game in (4) has at least one solution x * , therefore, there exists a λ * ∈ R m ≥0 such that the KKT conditions in (9) Proof of Lemma 2.Ā = A 1 + A 2 is given by a sum, therefore it is monotone if both the addend are [3, Proposition 20.10] . A 2 is monotone because it is skew symmetric [3, Corollary 20.28 ] and monotonicity of A 1 follows from
since Assumption 5 holds and L is cocoercive by the Baillon-Haddard Theorem and, therefore, monotone [3, Example 20.5] . To show thatĀ is Lipschitz continuous, we use the fact that F is ℓ F -Lipschitz and L is ℓ L -Lipschitz continuous:
Similarly we can prove that the skew symmetric part is ℓ A2 -Lipschitz continuous (with constant that depends on A and L) from which it follows thatĀ is ℓĀ = ℓ A1 + ℓ A2 -Lipschitz continuous. B is maximally monotone by [3, Proposition 20 .23] because G(x) is maximally monotone by Assumption 2 and Moreau Theorem [3, Theorem 20.25] and the Normal cone is maximally monotone [3, Example 20.26] . The fact that Φ −1Ā is monotone follows from the fact thatĀ is monotone:
Similarly it holds that Φ −1Ā is Lipschitz continuous and that Φ −1B is maximally monotone.
Proof of Lemma 3. First we notice that L ≥ 2d * and that by the Baillon-Haddard Theorem the Laplacian operator is 1 2d * -cocoercive. Then Statement 1) follow by this computation:
The operatorD is given by a sum, therefore it is maximally monotone if both the addend are [3, Proposition 20.23 ]. The first part is maximally monotone because the normal cone is and the second part is a skew symmetric matrix [ 
Appendix: Useful lemmas
We here recall some known facts about norms and sequence of random variables. Moreover, we include two preliminary results that are useful for the forthcoming convergence proofs.
Norm properties Now we recall some property of the norms that we will use in the proofs. We use the cosine rule (or Pythagorean identity)
x, y = 1 2
x, x + y, y − x − y 2 (30) and the following two property of the norm [3,
Property of the projection and proximal operator By [3, Proposition 12.26] , the projection operator and the proximity operators satisfy, respectively, the following inequalities. Let C be a nonempty closed convex set and let g be a proper lower semicontinuous function, then, for all x, y ∈ C
Sequence of random variables. We now recall some results concerning sequences of random variables, given the probability space (Ξ, F , P). The Robbins-Siegmund Lemma is widely used in literature to prove a.s. convergence of sequences of random variables. It first appeared in [33] .
Lemma 4 (Robbins-Siegmund Lemma, [33] ). Let F = (F k ) k∈N be a filtration. Let {α k } k∈N , {θ k } k∈N , {η k } k∈N and {χ k } k∈N be non negative sequences such that k η k < ∞, k χ k < ∞ and let
Then k θ k < ∞ and {α k } k∈N converges a.s. to a non negative random variable.
We also need this result for L p norms, known as Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality [36] .
Lemma 5 (Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality). Let {F k } be a filtration and {U k } k≥0 a vector-valued martingale relative to this filtration. Then, for all p ∈ [1, ∞), there exists a universal constant c p > 0 such that for every k ≥ 1
When combined with Minkowski inequality, we obtain for all p ≥ 2 a constant C p > 0 such that for every k ≥ 1
Preliminary results Given Lemma 5, we prove a preliminary result on the variance of the stochastic error.
Proposition 1. For all k ≥ 0, if Assumption 8 holds, we have a.s.
We first prove that
then the claim follows immediately. Define the process {M S S (x)} S i=0 as M 0 (x) = 0 and for 1 ≤ i ≤ S
.
is a martingale starting at 0. Let
Then, by Equation (17), we have
By applying Lemma 5, we have
We note that M S S (x k ) = ǫ k , hence by taking the square we conclude that
Remark 13. We note that if Proposition 1 holds, then it follows that
We collect in the next Lemma some inequalities that follows from the definition of the algorithm in (14) . Lemma 6. Given Algorithm 1 in compact form (14) , the following hold.
Appendix: Proofs of Section 4.1
Proof of Theorem 1. Using the property of proximal operator (34) we have
Using Lemma 6.1, (36) becomes
Then, adding (35) and (37) we obtain
Now we use the cosine rule (30) ,
and we note that
Then reordering and substituting in (38) we obtain
SinceĀ is monotone, it holds that
Now we apply Lemma 6.2 and Lemma 6.3 to ω k+1 − ω * :
Substituting in (39) , grouping and reordering it yields
where we used Assumption 9. Moreover, using Lipschitz continuity of F and Cauchy-Schwartz and Young's inequality
Similarly we can bound the term involving the stochastic errors
To use Lemma 4, let
Applying the Robbins Siegmund Lemma we conclude that α k converges and that θ k is summable. This implies that the sequence {ω k } is bounded and that ω k −ω k → 0 (othewise 1 δ ω k −ω k 2 = ∞). Therefore {ω k } has at least one cluster pointω. Moreover, since θ k < ∞, res(ω k ) 2 → 0 and res(ω k ) 2 = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof is similar to Theorem 1 but we do not use monotonicity. Therefore, the steps are the same, with the exception of (40). Indeed, the terms inB are not present in this case and Ā (ω k ), ω k − ω * ≥ 0 by Assumption 11. The the conclusion follows as in Theorem 1.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. The first part of the proof is the same as Theorem 1 since the resolvent is firmly non expansive but we do not use the residual nor monotonicity. Then, taking the expected value and grouping in (43), we have
where the inequality follows by Proposition 1 and Assumptions 7 and 13. To use Lemma 4, let
Then we conclude that α k converges and θ k is summable. This implies that {ω k } is bounded and that ω k −ω k → 0. Therefore {ω k } has at least one cluster pointω. Moreover, Φ −1C (ω k ), ω k − ω * → 0 and C (ω),ω − ω * = 0. SinceC is cocoercive, it also satisfy the cut property, thereforeω is a solution.
13 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. We start by using the fact that the projection is firmly quasinonexpansive.
Using Lemma 6.2 and 6.3 as in (41), we can rewrite the inequality as
Applying the Young's inequality to the inner products we obtain
Then (44) becomes
Using Lemma 6.1 and Assumption 7, reordering and taking the expected value
Applying Lemma 4, we deduce that {x k } and {x k } k∈N are bounded sequence and that they have a cluster point, that is,x k →x and x k → x. Sincex k = (1 − δ)x k + δx k−1 , taking the limit, we obtain thatx = x. Moreover, since F(x k ), x * − x k ≤ 0, again by Lemma 4, we obtain that F(x), x − x * = 0 which, using the cut property, implies that x is a solution.
14 Appendix: Proofs of Section 6.2
Proof of Corollary 4. We apply Lemma 4 to (46). Therefore, {x k } and {x k } k∈N are bounded sequence and that they have a cluster pointx. Moreover, F(x k ), x * − x k → 0 and F(x), x − x * = 0 but this contradicts the acute angle property thereforex is a solution.
Proof of Corollary 5. We use the weak sharpness property in (46) to obtain
x * ∈SOL(F,Ω)
x − x * + 4λ 2 k F(x k ) 2 Applying lemma 4, {x k } and {x k } k∈N are bounded sequence and that they have a cluster pointx. Moreover, min x * ∈SOL(F,Ω) x − x * → 0 and x − x * = 0, that is,x is a solution.
